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The Persistent Vegetative State: 
A View across the Legal Divide 
H. RICHARD BERESFORD“ 
Cornell Law School 
lthaca, New York 
and 
Department of Neurology 
University of Rochester School of Medicine 
Rochester, New York 
Praise for Fred Plum can take many forms: for pedagogical dynamism, for depth and 
breadth of contributions to neurology and neuroscience, for sure-handed guidance of 
a department that has infused neurology with today’s and tomorrow’s leaders, and 
for a truly uncanny ability to fan a drive to excel in those he has touched. Mindful 
of his admonition to be substantive in what one says and does, my praise will 
embody a few reflections on the enduring legal and social impact of the “point of 
view” he and Bryan Jennett authored for the journal Lancet in 1972.’ 
THE LANCET PAPER 
Recognizing the need for an acceptable term to describe patients who are 
“neither unconscious nor in coma in the usual sense of these terms,” Jennett and 
Plum proposed the term “persistent vegetative state” (hereinafter PVS). It was of 
course not the choice of label that made their effort important-although it bears 
noting that, to this day and despite various attempts to come up with a better 
descriptor, the term enjoys general acceptance in both medicalZ and legal3 forums. 
What Jennett and Plum accomplished is a particularly vivid reminder that some 
severely brain-injured persons may have “wakefulness without awareness.” Such 
individuals may exhibit coordinated motor responses after noxious stimuli or even 
spontaneously, and may utter sounds, move their eyes, grimace, smile, or even 
swallow food or liquids placed in their mouths. Yet it is impossible to demonstrate 
that they respond in a discernibly conscious way to specific auditory, visual or other 
sensory inputs. In short, there is, despite an apparent wakefulness, the “absence 
of any evidence of a functioning mind which is either receiving or projecting infor- 
mation.”’ 
The fact that subcortical and brain-stem structures remain functional allows 
prolonged survivals if caregivers attend to nutrition and hygiene. This potential for 
indefinite survival, observed Jennett and Plum, “presents a problem with humanitar- 
ian and socioeconomic implications which society as a whole will have to confront.”‘ 
The problem is indeed profound and has generated-and will continue to gener- 
ate-practical and conceptual dilemmas for physicians and the legal system. 
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THE QUINLAN LITIGATION 
The PVS became a center of legal controversy in 1976 when Fred Plum and 
others testified that Karen Quinlan was in a PVS and would remain that way. What 
the court failed to hear-or at least failed to grasp-was his additional testimony 
that her survival was not necessarily dependent on use of a mechanical ventilator. 
Whether this judicial misconception affected the ultimate decision by the New 
Jersey Supreme Court is speculative. However, both the trial court and the state 
supreme court assumed that removal of the ventilator would shortly lead to her 
death. 
The judiciary in Quinlan conceived its role as determining the lawfulness of 
allowing Ms. Quinlan to die by reason of removal of her life support. To this 
end, it sought assurance from medical experts who testified that she was surely 
permanently unconscious, and heard testimony from her father, physicians, theolo- 
gians and others about the moral basis for authorizing her father to request removal 
of the respirator. Having appraised this evidence, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
ultimately ruled that if her physicians agreed there was “clear and convincing” 
evidence she was permanently unconscious and a hospital ethics committee con- 
curred in this prognosis, her father could, under the legal doctrine of substituted 
judgment, lawfully exercise her constitutional right of privacy to refuse the ventila- 
tor! As many readers know, the ventilator was then discontinued and Ms. Quinlan 
survived nearly 10 years-as Fred Plum might have predicted. A recent report in 
The New England Journal of Medicine described the neuropathological findings 
in her brain.-’ Although cortical scarring was present (especially in parietal and 
occipital regions), the most extensive scarring was in the thalami. Basal forebrain, 
brain stem and hypothalamus were largely intact. 
In rationalizing its decision, the New Jersey court opined that allowing Ms. 
Quinlan to live in a PVS was akin to asking her to “endure the ~nendurable.”~ It 
hypothesized that if she were granted a brief lucid interval to gauge her plight, she 
might readily conclude that continuing survival was something she would choose 
to forego. The court thus viewed PVS as a condition that at least some sapient 
persons would regard as equivalent to death. Consistent with this view, the court 
discounted the assertion of Ms.Quinlan’s attending neurologist that his reluctance to 
remove the respirator stemmed from uncertainty over whether this was a medically 
appropriate action. The court-without supporting evidence-simply assumed that 
his reluctance reflected fear of adverse legal consequences. In other words, it must 
have seemed axiomatic to the court that an informed physician would not allow a 
commitment to protecting human life to engender treatments that would do no 
more than extend a life of perpetual unawareness. 
Responding to concerns that it was authorizing euthanasia, the court offered 
two defenses. First, it declared that if Ms. Quinlan died after removal of the ventila- 
tor, the cause of death would be the brain disorder that caused her to be in a PVS, 
not the withdrawal of support for respiration. Second, even if there were a causal 
link between death and removal of treatment, the court viewed any “homicide” 
as justifiable because it would implement her constitutional right to decline medi- 
cal treatment. 
LITIGATION AFTER Q U Z N W  
Since the decision in Quinlan, many courts have approved requests to end 
life support for persons in PVS.6-8 Although dissenting judges have occasionally 
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vociferated about the devaluation of “life” that these decisions imply,” a consensus 
has developed that permanent unconsciousness is a cogent justification for ending 
life support. Legal controversies now tend to center on whether life support can 
lawfully be withdrawn from individuals whose preferences are unknown or unknow- 
able, on whether severe neurological afflictions with preservation of rudimentary 
awareness should be approached in the same way as PVS, and on whether a legally 
meaningful distinction exists between removal of a mechanical life support and 
removal of fluids and nutrition. Of these, the first two draw the most attention and 
will be highlighted in the brief discussion that follows. 
The Conroy Litigation 
Several years after the Quinlan decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court was 
asked to rule on the request by the nephew of the severely brain-injured Claire 
Conroy to remove her feeding tube. Ms. Conroy was not in a PVS-her physicians 
had detected modest behavioral responses to sensory stimuli. She was, however, 
severely demented, incontinent, and bedbound in a nursing home and had no 
prospects for clinical improvement. Her wishes about use of the feeding tube were 
unknown, but her nephew believed that removal of the tube was consistent with 
her previously exhibited attitudes and values. After prolonged litigation, the court 
ruled-after her death-in In re Conroy9 that the medical facts did not justify 
granting the nephew the authority he sought. However, the court did prescribe a 
procedure for use in nursing homes that would permit withdrawal of life support 
from severely impaired residents whose preferences are unknown. 
Under the Conroy court’s formula, life support could be stopped if there is 
“clear and convincing” evidence that the burdens of sustaining life exceed the 
benefits of continuing survival. In making this “objective” determination, the court 
indicated that physical pain is the operative burden and that proof of intractable 
pain is necessary before the burden of survival should be taken as outweighing the 
benefits of remaining alive. An individual would thus need enough awareness to 
experience demonstrably intractable pain before life support could be stopped 
under this “objective” prong of the Conroy formula, a requirement that obviously 
excludes individuals in a PVS. 
The Cruzan Case 
The primacy of autonomous choice in end-of-life decisions is exemplified in the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Cruzan v. Dire~tor .~  The core of the dispute 
between family and caregivers was not over whether Nancy Cruzan was in a PVS. 
The testlfying neurological experts largely agreed on that point, and the Court 
exhibited no qualms about the idea that a competent individual might prefer death 
over life in a PVS. However, the Court upheld a Missouri statute that required 
“clear and convincing” proof that this was indeed Ms. Cruzan’s choice. It would 
not concede that being in a PVS is in itself a lawful justification for ending life 
support. In other words, the Court was unwilling to presume that Nancy Cruzan-or 
anyone else for that matter-would actually choose to reject a feeding tube in such 
a circumstance. Although there are data on which the Court could have relied in 
adopting such a presumption, its refusal was consistent with prevailing law.” The 
Court’s decision in Cruzan thus underscores the powerful impact of the autonomy 
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principle in deliberations about whether to continue life support for individuals in 
PVS or with other severe neurological impairments. 
The Supreme Court did not say that it is unlawful in all circumstances to end 
life support for individuals in a PVS if their wishes cannot be ascertained. But it 
did indicate that a state's interest in protecting the life of its citizens empowers the 
state, in a constitutional sense, to require convincing proof that ending life support 
is what the afflicted person would have chosen, whether by written advance directive 
or by unambiguous oral statements. In a separate opinion, moreover, Justice Scalia 
even suggested that a state legislature could, in the interests of upholding the 
preeminent value of life, bar removal of life support from those in a PVS-even 
if this constraint is contrary to their autonomously expressed wishes. These threads 
suggest that the Court will be inclined to defer to democratically enacted laws 
concerning decisions about removal of life support. If this interpretation is correct, 
state lawmakers should have considerable leeway in developing standards and rules 
for end-of-life decisions affecting individuals with severe neurological impairments. 
It thus seems appropriate to consider non-autonomy based justifications state law- 
makers might use to guide their policy choices. 
JUSTIFYING LIFE-ENDING DECISIONS 
PVS as Death 
As Plum and colleagues have shown with positron emission tomography, cerebral 
blood flow and metabolism can be profoundly impaired in the PVS." Law professor 
David Smith has used this information to buttress an argument that PVS should 
be treated for legal purposes as equivalent to brain death.'* He is not the first to 
propose that a permanent loss of consciousness be regarded as a death of the human 
person, and that ethical and legal rules should be modified to take this into account, 
but he is the first to rely substantially on advances in neuroscience to reorient 
societal attitudes about the relationship between consciousness and human life. 
Although his proposal has not attracted wide support, it challenges the many who 
readily accept the notion of brain death to explain why the two types of permanent 
unawareness, brain death and PVS, should have different legal connotations. 
An obvious response is that, in the present state of the art of neurology, brain 
death is an absolute indicator of permanent unconsciousness, whereas a diagnosis 
of PVS cames with it a small but somewhat quantifiable chance that some awareness 
will ret~rn.2. '~ Another response might be that using consciousness as the measure 
of life risks indeterminacy because of the difficulties that inhere in amving at an 
agreement on definition of the term,I4 even among physicians.Is It is arguably easier 
to rely on a demonstrated presence or absence of brain-stem functions as the 
measure of human life. In this construct, the concept of mind plays no role in the 
definition of life; it is the brain stem that counts, no matter what the state of 
the neocortex. 
PVS as Diminished Lve 
Even if the PVS is not the same as death, there is an emerging consensus that 
traditional constraints on decisions about life support apply less stringently to 
persons in a PVS than to persons with lesser impairments. For example, the New 
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York Do Not Rescucitate law includes permanent unconsciousness as one of four 
grounds for writing a DNR order,I6 and the federal child abuse law would allow 
ending life support for neonates who are “irreversibly comatose.”17 Also, the Quin- 
fan court explicitly declared that the state’s interest in protecting life wanes in 
proportion to the prognosis for regaining awareness! In other words, not all lives 
are equal when it comes to applying protective legal and ethical rules. The slippery 
slope concerns here are obvious. Although these concerns should help to constrain 
temptations to expand the definition of diminished life, they also probably assure 
that the legal system will continue to be called on to resolve uncertainties about 
the rightness of withdrawing care from some individuals with severe neurological im- 
pairments. 
PVS and the Beneficence Principle 
A professional obligation of physicians is to provide treatments that help their 
patients and withhold treatments that burden or do not help. For PVS and other 
severe neurological impairments, the universe of demonstrably helpful treatments 
is small once adequate nutrition and hygiene have been provided. Yet is is also 
difficult to envision treatments that are burdensome to such individuals. They are, 
by definition, too neurologically compromised to experience quantifiable suffering. 
Thus, applying a traditional benefitburden analysis to evaluate what care to provide 
or withhold is not a fruitful enterprise. If we take into account the suffering of 
caregivers or the strength of public attitudes about what ought or ought not to be 
done, then it might be possible to arrive at a calculus of benefits or burdens. 
However, this would have little to do with the interests of the afflicted individual 
unless, for example, he or she had once strongly expressed a wish not to be a 
financial or emotional burden on others. In this scenario, it might be defensible to 
hold that prolonging survival is indeed a burden that could be weighed against the 
contestable benefit of remaining alive. 
PVS and Resource Allocation 
The social costs of caring for individuals with severe neurological impairments 
are already substantial. Moreover, for the near term at least, developing treatments 
are more likely to extend life span than to achieve meaningful neurological improve- 
ment. The polity therefore faces increasingly hard choices about how many resources 
to allocate to persons who will never improve or achieve any capacity for social 
participation. One option is to do as Oregon has done: formally and explicitly 
establish categories of illnesses or individuals to whom few or no public resources 
are allocated.’* This sort of rationing is contentious anywhere, but especially so in 
a society as wealthy as ours. Nevertheless, the current drive to constrain health 
care costs through greater reliance on market forces and reduced public expenditures 
will almost inevitably result in fewer resources being available to care for those 
with severe and permanent neurological impairments. 
The legal system in the United States affords no constitutional or other formal 
entitlement to health care-although federal and state legislation do offer a variety 
of safety nets-and the public seems quite tolerant of the fact that millions of 
citizens lack health insurance or secure access to minimally adequate health services. 
In this cultural setting, it is not difficult to foresee a growing public willingess to 
skimp on care for the severely brain injured. A simple ethical justification for this 
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attitude is that health resources are finite and must be expended where they do  
the most good. Individuals with severe neurological impairments arguably have a 
weak claim on these limited resources because they have so little to gain from 
treatment. Whatever claim they have would rest on the principle that all human 
lives have instrinsic value and that a moral society will expend a decent minimum 
of resources to sustain those lives. Yet, as we have seen, the judiciary and much 
of the public have accepted the proposition that society’s obligation to the severely 
brain injured does not include use of all available life-extending resources. Against 
this backdrop, it may be worthwhile to look at the role of clinical neurologists in 
decisional processes that could eventuate in ending life support for the severely 
brain injured. 
NEUROLOGISTS AND PVS 
Formal Ethical Standards 
The American Academy of Neurology holds that it is ethical to withdraw life 
support (including fluids and nutrition) from a patient in a PVS, provided the 
diagnosis is secure and there is evidence this accords with the patient’s wishes.I9 
The Academy’s position rests on the considered belief that the PVS, as defined by 
Jennett and Plum, is diagnosable and that its salient feature is an irreversible loss 
of awareness. It further reflects an assumption that consciousness is what confers 
special value on human life. 
In a sense, the Academy position on PVS is inconsistent with its later declaration 
that the taking of vital organs from anencephalic infants for purposes of transplanta- 
tion is unethical because it violates the “dead donor” rule.2O Individuals in a PVS 
and anencephalic infants are both permanently unconscious, and it is arguably 
illogical to suggest that actions which cause their deaths-removal of a feeding 
tube or removal of both kidneys-are ethical for one but not the other. Several 
counterarguments can be raised, however. The most straightforward is that the 
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act,Z1 which regulates organ transplantation, requires 
that heart-beating donors be brain dead before their organs can be removed. Also, 
surgical removal of organs is a far more invasive, coarse, and immediate cause of 
death than removal of a feeding tube or respirator. Moreover, society has always 
treated newborns with a special solicitude and using them as organ sources, even 
for the most altruistic of purposes, may be too crass to contemplate. 
Whatever the inconsistency between the two statements, they stress the need 
for careful and rigorous assessments of severely brain-injured individuals and con- 
current sensitivity to legal and social overtones. In these respects, the statements 
recognize that both clinical expertise and enlightened citizenship should be brought 
to bear, a call that Jennett and Plum heralded in the Lancet paper. However, 
conflating applications of neurological expertise with ethical and social policy 
choices can be problematic.22 
Without offering a definition of consciousness, the Academy’s position statement 
on the PVS declares that permanent unconsciousness can be reliably identified. A 
recent comprehensive review of published studies2’ lends support to this view. It 
cites two types of evidence. One type constitutes the accumulated experience of 
neurological clinicians applying established criteria for the diagnosis of PVS, coupled 
with outcome data which reveal that individuals vegetative for longer than one 
year rarely regain awareness. The second type of evidence derives from in uiuo 
neuroimaging and postmortem neuropathology. The imaging studies demonstrate 
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profound cortical hypometabolism in PVS, and autopsy studies typically reveal 
extensive neocortical injury. It thus appears that neurologists can offer a tenable 
diagnosis of PVS by applying appropriately rigorous clinical standards, but it is less 
clear that they can offer expert guidance to those who must actually decide whether 
to withdraw life support. 
Boundaries of Neurological Expertise 
Assume for the moment that an accurate diagnosis of PVS can be made. Does 
it then follow that neurologists’ opinions about what ought to be done should 
be given special weight by families or other decision makers? For example, can 
neurologists confidently assure decision makers that individuals whose eyes are 
open and who move and make sounds nevertheless cannot experience pain or 
pleasure? Can they accurately predict how long the individuals will survive? Can 
they communicate a sense of what it is to be “unconscious”? Can they inform 
decision makers as to what constitutes an appropriate allocation of resources for 
one in a PVS? If not, the neurologist’s role appears narrow, albeit pivotal. It is 
narrow in the sense that the ethical issue of whether life support ought to be stopped 
must be resolved by others (for example, families, primary providers, courts). It is 
pivotal because the issue of whether to end life support is not ripe for discussion 
until there is no more than trivial uncertainty about diagnosis or prognosis. 
If making a diagnosis of PVS is indeed the principal contribution neurologists 
can make in resolving the ethical and legal dilemma, the reliability of the diagnosis 
assumes overriding importance. The 1994 review? noted above, concluded that 
recovery of consciousness in adults who have been vegetative for more than one 
year is “exceedingly rare.” The few persons who did regain consciousness after 
that interval, including one who had been vegetative for 36 months, were totally 
dependent and had severe residual neurological impairments. A more recent report 
in the same journal described a patient who regained consciousness after 17 months 
in a vegetative state.‘) After reviewing available data describing recovery of aware- 
ness after one year in a vegetative state, the authors estimated that the probability 
of regaining some awareness was 14 percent. If this figure is accurate, the question 
then emerges as to how certain neurologists can be when they offer their opinions 
to families, primary providers, ethics committees or courts. 
Available data clearly would support an opinion that an adult who has been 
vegetative for more than one year will probably not regain consciousness. These 
data may also amount to “clear and convincing” evidence, a more exacting legal 
standard. However, they do not appear to support an opinion that meets the most 
rigorous legal standard of “beyond a reasonable doubt.” This standard requires 
something akin to moral certainty about the accuracy of an opinion. At minimum, 
a neurologist could still testify with moral certainty that a person in a PVS for more 
than one year will have severe neurological disabilities and will be incapable of 
independent living, whether or not consciousness returns. 
Decision makers may or may not rely on neurological opinions that rest on less 
than moral certainty. They could, for example, accept opinions based on the sort 
of probabilities clinicians ordinarily apply in their clinical practices. These seldom 
add up to moral certainty, and may not even meet a “clear and convincing” test 
of legal probity. On the other hand, where reliance on an opinion may lead to a 
decision to cause or hasten the death of an individual, decision makers may insist 
that opinions rest on a moral certainty as to their accuracy. These considerations 
have clear significance for neurologists asked to venture opinions about individuals 
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in PVS. They should try to determine what standard of certainty they are expected 
to meet, and should self-critically evaluate whether their opinions will satisfy that 
standard. Since the data available to support an opinion are somewhat “soft,” the 
challenge may be daunting; however, trying to sidestep the challenge could deform 
an ethically sensitive decisional process that calls for the best that neurological 
clinicians have to offer. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The debate over what justifies ending life support for individuals with severe 
neurological impairments will continue. Wider use of advance directives and a 
growing willingness of lawmakers to countenance autonomous life-ending choices 
will temper the debate. However, the public is likely to remain uneasy about slippery 
slopes and about threats to the sanctity of life it may perceive in efforts to calibrate 
legal and ethical protections by reference to the status of the neocortex. In this 
context, the contributions of Fred Plum stand out. By stressing the defining role 
of higher cortical functions for the human condition and by challenging clinicians, 
lawmakers and others to engage over the meaning of irretrievable loss of these 
functions, he has both framed and richly informed the debate. 
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